EU Citizens Support Action Against Democratic Erosion, Study Reveals
A new study highlights the strong preference among EU citizens for financial penalties against member states violating democratic norms.
A recent study titled "Democratic backsliding and support for public good provision in the European Union," conducted by political scientists Max Heermann, Sharon Baute, and Dirk Leuffen, has examined citizens' responses across four countries—Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden—regarding democratic standards in the EU. The research indicates that a majority of respondents prioritize democratic principles above national allegiance, expressing robust support for EU actions that may include financial penalties against member states that undermine democratic norms.
The study particularly points to the EU's cohesion policy, designed to foster economic and social convergence within the bloc.
While this policy has been pivotal in channeling financial resources to less affluent regions, the authors raise concerns about its effectiveness in mitigating democratic backsliding.
They highlight a paradox where cohesion funds have, at times, inadvertently supported regimes that are undermining democratic principles, due to a lack of strong political conditionality linked to these funds.
Although mechanisms aiming to connect funding with respect for the rule of law have been introduced, institutional constraints coupled with political compromises have limited their effectiveness, leaving cohesion policy as both a symbol of unity and a flashpoint for debates over the EU's democratic integrity.
Hungary exemplifies the challenges facing the EU in this regard.
Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's leadership since 2010, Hungary has experienced significant declines in democratic checks and balances, judicial independence, and media diversity.
Despite the European Union's legal tools—including infringement procedures and conditionality designed to protect the rule of law—efforts to reverse this decline have met with minimal success.
Weak enforcement mechanisms, hesitance from EU institutions to escalate confrontations, and Hungary's strategic maneuvers within EU governance have further complicated the situation.
Despite these hurdles, the study finds that citizens across Europe largely favor decisive actions over inaction, with substantial support for the idea of tying EU funding to adherence to democratic standards, even if this approach might temporarily impede broader EU objectives.
To address the ongoing democratic erosion in Hungary, the study’s authors advocate for a more consistent and principled application of conditionality mechanisms.
They also suggest increasing support for civil society organizations within member states experiencing democratic backsliding.
A policy brief by Thu Nguyen, deputy director at the Jacques Delors Centre, echoes these sentiments.
Nguyen presents a structured approach aimed at addressing the situation in Hungary, asserting that the violations of EU principles necessitate a legal response rather than expulsion, which would be impractical under existing EU framework.
Nguyen's proposed strategy encompasses three key actions: maintaining the freeze on cohesion funds, with approximately €22 billion currently withheld due to Hungary's rule of law violations—amounting to around 11 percent of Hungary’s GDP—thereby leveraging financial pressure contingent on necessary reforms.
The second component involves politically isolating Hungary by advancing EU initiatives through "coalitions of the willing", potentially engaging non-EU countries, reminiscent of previous efforts in the Schengen area and eurozone.
Finally, the brief suggests reconsidering Hungary's voting rights in the EU Council.
Although progress on Article 7 proceedings has been stagnant in the past, recent political changes in Poland could create opportunities to revisit this matter.
While complete suspension of voting rights seems improbable in the near term, initiating this process would convey the EU's diminished tolerance for ongoing violations of its foundational values.
In addressing these issues, Nguyen underscores the necessity for long-term institutional reforms aimed at amending the unanimity requirement for key policy decisions, arguing that the current structure exposes the EU to vulnerabilities stemming from potential internal sabotage.
The study particularly points to the EU's cohesion policy, designed to foster economic and social convergence within the bloc.
While this policy has been pivotal in channeling financial resources to less affluent regions, the authors raise concerns about its effectiveness in mitigating democratic backsliding.
They highlight a paradox where cohesion funds have, at times, inadvertently supported regimes that are undermining democratic principles, due to a lack of strong political conditionality linked to these funds.
Although mechanisms aiming to connect funding with respect for the rule of law have been introduced, institutional constraints coupled with political compromises have limited their effectiveness, leaving cohesion policy as both a symbol of unity and a flashpoint for debates over the EU's democratic integrity.
Hungary exemplifies the challenges facing the EU in this regard.
Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's leadership since 2010, Hungary has experienced significant declines in democratic checks and balances, judicial independence, and media diversity.
Despite the European Union's legal tools—including infringement procedures and conditionality designed to protect the rule of law—efforts to reverse this decline have met with minimal success.
Weak enforcement mechanisms, hesitance from EU institutions to escalate confrontations, and Hungary's strategic maneuvers within EU governance have further complicated the situation.
Despite these hurdles, the study finds that citizens across Europe largely favor decisive actions over inaction, with substantial support for the idea of tying EU funding to adherence to democratic standards, even if this approach might temporarily impede broader EU objectives.
To address the ongoing democratic erosion in Hungary, the study’s authors advocate for a more consistent and principled application of conditionality mechanisms.
They also suggest increasing support for civil society organizations within member states experiencing democratic backsliding.
A policy brief by Thu Nguyen, deputy director at the Jacques Delors Centre, echoes these sentiments.
Nguyen presents a structured approach aimed at addressing the situation in Hungary, asserting that the violations of EU principles necessitate a legal response rather than expulsion, which would be impractical under existing EU framework.
Nguyen's proposed strategy encompasses three key actions: maintaining the freeze on cohesion funds, with approximately €22 billion currently withheld due to Hungary's rule of law violations—amounting to around 11 percent of Hungary’s GDP—thereby leveraging financial pressure contingent on necessary reforms.
The second component involves politically isolating Hungary by advancing EU initiatives through "coalitions of the willing", potentially engaging non-EU countries, reminiscent of previous efforts in the Schengen area and eurozone.
Finally, the brief suggests reconsidering Hungary's voting rights in the EU Council.
Although progress on Article 7 proceedings has been stagnant in the past, recent political changes in Poland could create opportunities to revisit this matter.
While complete suspension of voting rights seems improbable in the near term, initiating this process would convey the EU's diminished tolerance for ongoing violations of its foundational values.
In addressing these issues, Nguyen underscores the necessity for long-term institutional reforms aimed at amending the unanimity requirement for key policy decisions, arguing that the current structure exposes the EU to vulnerabilities stemming from potential internal sabotage.
